

Towards a European Banking Union:

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
ABI Convention “BASILEA 3”

Roma, 27 June 2013

Money market fragmentation

Cross-country standard deviation of average unsecured interbank lending rates across euro area countries (EONIA/EURIBOR)

(61-day moving average: basis points)




Source: EBF and ECB calculations.

Notes: All countries means here the following countries: AT, BE, DE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LU, NL, PT, “non-distressed countries” are in that sample AT, BE, DE, FI, FR, LU, NL.


International risk sharing

Claims of euro area banks
(USD tr.)



Fiscal-banking loop

Sovereign and bank CDS spreads: euro area and US
(2010 – July 2013; basis points)




Source: Bloomberg.
Note: Average CDS spread for euro area and US LCBGs and countries where LCBGs are located.

Source: ECB.

Supervisory fragmentation


Euro area large and complex banking groups' risk weights for corporate and retail credit exposures (percentages; maximum, minimum, interquartile distribution and median)



Sources: Individual institutions' Pillar 3 reports and ECB calculations.


Overbanking

Total bank assets in the EU, Japan and the US
(2012, EUR trillion; percentage of GDP)



Source: ECB, FDIC and Bank of Japan.

Funding of non-financial corporations in the euro area and the United States
(2002 – Q1 2012; cumulated debt shares)




Source: Cour-Thimann and Winkl (2013)

Problems to be addressed

- **Adverse loop between banks, public finances, macro performance**
- **Financial fragmentation**
- **Fragmented and ineffective banking supervision, national bias**
- **Incoherent bank crisis management, no transparent burden sharing**

Banking Union: elements



Institutional scope

Significant credit institutions:

- 1) size: assets >30 bn; ratio assets/GDP exceeds 20% (but >5 bn)
- 2) importance for the economy of the EU or any MS
- 3) direct financial assistance from EFSF or ESM
- 4) 3 largest banks in each country
- 5) ECB decision

ECB supervision, with assistance of national authorities in the preparatory and implementing activities.

Less significant credit institutions

National supervision with ECB controls

Functional scope

➤ All classic micro-prudential tools:

- Authorisation of banking activity, mergers and acquisitions
- Prudential requirements (own funds, large exposure limits, liquidity, leverage and disclosure, internal governance and controls, “fit and proper”, ...)
- Supervisory reviews, stress tests, additional prudential requirements

➤ Macro-prudential tools:

- National authorities remain competent for national macro-prudential requirements (e.g. loan-to-value ratio).
- For instruments in EU law (CR Directive), e.g. countercyclical and SIFI buffers:
 - ✓ national authorities have to notify the intended decision to the ECB
 - ✓ ECB can apply more stringent macro-prudential measures

Remain at national level: supervision over non-banks; anti-fraud; consumer protection

Geographical scope

Single supervisor automatically includes all euro countries. Right to enter for the “outs”

•Non-euro member states can join in “close cooperation” by:

- ✓ Adopting appropriate legislation and committing to abide to any guidelines or requests by the ECB
- ✓ provide all information on its credit institutions that the ECB may request

Key institutional features

- **Supervision separate from monetary policy**
- **Independence**
- **Accountability**

Timing

- **June 2012: Euro area Summit launches the Banking Union**
- **September 2012: Commission first draft**
- **December 2012: agreement in EU Council**
- **1st half 2013: agreement with European Parliament**

Next steps:

- **Formal adoption of the SSM Regulation (this Summer)**
- **Secondary legislation, public consultations (end-year)**
- **Bank balance sheet assessment, “due diligence”: June 2014**
- **Operational start: second half 2014**

Main preparatory works

**Mapping of Euro Area
Banking System**

**Legal issues relating to
Framework Regulation**

**“Supervisory Model”
and “Supervisory
Manual”**

**Supervisory Reporting
Issues - reporting
template**

**Comprehensive review
incl. a balance sheet
assessment**

**Organogram and staff
(about 800 people to
start, plus support)**

Crisis management framework

- **Why a crisis management framework:**
 - ✓ Prevents moral hazard
 - ✓ Limits systemic risks
- **EU “bail in” framework** (creditor hierarchy)
- **EU Bank resolution authority**
 - ✓ Orderly bank failures
 - ✓ Limits taxpayer exposure
- **EU resolution framework** (ex-ante and ex-post funding, backstop)
- **Depositor protection** (national, for now)

Conclusions

Opportunities:

- Break bank-fiscal interactions
- Break national supervisory silos, home biases
- Reduce fragmentation, improve single market
- Help stabilise the euro

Challenges:

- Proper crisis management framework
- Exploit synergy between national authorities (information, experience) and the ECB (level-playing field, European orientation)
- Transitional issues (avoid early mistakes, reputational loss)