

International Economic Outlook

Jean-Michel Six

Managing Director & Chief Economist EMEA

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


### **Key Macroeconomic Themes for 2015/16**

- Global growth rebalancing from developing markets to developed markets well under way:
  - ✓ Growth steadily accelerating in the US, steady in UK
  - ✓ Structural slowdown in China: 7% is the new norm. Important implications for other EM's, especially commodity producers
- Assessing the effects of lower oil, weaker euro and stronger growth in the US on EZ growth:
  - ✓ Lower oil prices: +0.4pc on Household consumption growth, +0.2 to 0.4pc on GDP growth
  - ✓ Weaker euro FX: +0.3pc on EZ exports; Italy will benefit the most , given strong price elasticity of exports
  - ✓ Stronger US GDP growth: +0.1pc on EZ GDP
- ECB has its credibility at stake: €1 trillion QE will take time before material effects become visible
- Despite some positive developments we still anticipate sub-par growth in Eurozone, especially France, Italy, as investment recovery remains elusive.



### **World Trade Growth Remains Soft (Volume Import Indices)**




Source: Netherland Bureau of Economic Research: latest data point January 2015



### **Diverging Performances**

The global economy is characterized by a major gap in relative performance between the developed and emerging economies. To the extent that global growth has lifted since the height of the EMU debt crisis in 2012, it has been focused in the DM, where GDP gains have moved above potential. By contrast, EM growth has weakened and fallen even further below trend. This growth divergence is expected to persist in 2015

#### Real GDP (%ch Y/Y)





Source: IMF, S&P Forecast



## **Global Manufacturing PMI Heatmap**

	11/13	12/13	01/14	02/14	03/14	04/14	05/14	06/14	07/14	08/14	09/14	10/14	11/14	12/14	01/15	02/15	03/15
Europe	52.6	53.3	54.5	53.8	53.4	53.8	52.8	52.4	52.2	51	50.6	51.1	50.8	51	51.6	51.7	52.7
Euro Zone	51.6	52.7	54	53.2	53	53.4	52.2	51.8	51.8	50.7	50.3	50.6	50.1	50.6	51	51	52.2
France	48.4	47	49.3	49.7	52.1	51.2	49.6	48.2	47.8	46.9	48.8	48.5	48.4	47.5	49.2	47.6	48.8
Germany	52.7	54.3	56.5	54.8	53.7	54.1	52.3	52	52.4	51.4	49.9	51.4	49.5	51.2	50.9	51.1	52.8
Italy	51.4	53.3	53.1	52.3	52.4	54	53.2	52.6	51.9	49.8	50.7	49	49	48.4	49.9	51.9	53.3
Netherlands	56.8	57	54.8	55.2	53.7	53.4	53.6	52.3	53.5	51.7	52.2	53	54.6	53.5	54.1	52.2	52.5
Spain	48.6	50.8	52.2	52.5	52.8	52.7	52.9	54.6	53.9	52.8	52.6	52.6	54.7	53.8	54.7	54.2	54.3
UK	57.8	57.3	56.7	56.1	55.4	56.9	56.5	56.7	54.9	52.9	51.4	53.3	53.4	52.8	53	54	54.4
Poland	54.4	53.2	55.4	55.9	54	52	50.8	50.3	49.4	49	49.5	51.2	53.2	52.8	55.2	55.1	54.8
	-	48.8							-					48.9			
Russia	49.4		48	48.5	48.3	48.5	48.9	49.1	51	51	50.4	50.3	51.7		47.6	49.7	48.1
Turkey	55	53.5	52.7	53.4	51.7	51.1	50.1	48.8	48.5	50.3	50.4	51.5	52.2	51.4	49.8	49.6	48
Canada	55.3	53.5	51.7	52.9	53.3	52.9	52.2	53.5	54.3	54.8	53.5	55.3	55.3	53.9	51	48.7	48.9
US	54.7	55	53.7	57.1	55.5	55.4	56.4	57.3	55.8	57.9	57.5	55.9	54.8	53.9	53.9	55.1	55.7
Brazil	49.7	50.5	50.8	50.4	50.6	49.3	48.8	48.7	49.1	50.2	49.3	49.1	48.7	50.2	50.7	49.6	46.2
Mexico	51.9	52.6	54	52	51.7	51.8	51.9	51.8	51.5	52.1	52.6	53.3	54.3	55.3	56.6	54.4	53.8
China	50.8	50.5	49.5	48.5	48	48.1	49.4	50.7	51.7	50.2	50.2	50.4	50	49.6	49.7	50.7	49.6
India	51.3	50.7	51.4	52.5	51.3	51.3	51.4	51.5	53	52.4	51	51.6	53.3	54.5	52.9	51.2	52.1
Indonesia	50.3	50.7	51.4	50.5	50.1	51.1	52.4	52.7	52.7	49.5	50.7	49.2	48	47.6	48.5	47.5	46.4
	55.1	55.2	56.6	55.5	53.9	49.4	49.9	51.5	50.5	52.2	51.7	52.4	52	52	52.2	51.6	50.3
Japan S.Korea	50.4	50.8	50.9	49.8	50.4	50.2	49.5	48.4	49.3	50.3	48.8	48.7	49	49.9	51.1	51.0	49.2
S.Korea Taiwan	53.4	55.2	55.5	54.7	52.7	52.3	52.4	40.4 54	55.8	56.1	53.3	52	51.4	49.9 50	51.7	52.1	49.2 51
TaiWaii	55.4	55.2	00.0	34.7	52.7	52.3	52.4	54	55.8	30.1	53.3		51.4	50	51.7	-	31








ACBACABA BACCCCBACACB BACCABACAA The US Locomotive Is Back On Track CBABABCBCBAB CCCBACCBCCCBAC


## **US Economy Is Most Advanced Among G7 In Deleveraging**


### **US: Sectoral indebtedness**



#### Source: Haver Analytics


### **Eurozone: Financial balances**







## **US: Housing Bounces Back, Despite Dips**




Recovering from an historic drop

Source: S&P/Case-Shiller, October 2013; Census Bureau



### Manufacturing Returns to U.S.




- Cheap energy attracts manufacturers
- Equipment production largely recovered
- Capacity utilization has improved

Source: Federal Reserve; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Standard & Poor's Ratings Services Projections



## **Quantitative Easing: Coming Down The Mountain**




Note: (1) Balance sheet's shrinkage to normal size starts on June of 2015 in all scenarios. The future "normal size" is based off pre-crisis linear trend. (2) In the passive run-off case, U.S. Treasury Securities are allowed to run-off as they mature and MBS pre-payments are assumed to to be an average of \$250 billion per year till mid- 2018, \$150 billion per year the next 2 years, and \$100 billion per year then on. In this scenario, balance sheet reaches normal size by 8/23. (3) In the Aggressive Shrinkage scenario, securities worth \$3.3 trillion are aggressively



CABACBACABAB BAAABACB BCCCA BACAB ABACCCCBACACBCB AABCABACCABACAA BACACA A New Oil Shock CBABABCBCBA BACABACBBAA CCCBACCBCCCBACC BACCABCAB

### A US\$20pb fall boosts world GDP by around 0.3%

## GDP impact of \$20 oil price decline average impact on level of GDP








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### And reduces consumer prices by about 1.2%

### Price level impact of \$20 oil price decline






## The Steep Drop in Oil Prices Is A Windfall To Asia Pacific

### **Most of APAC Is Running A Sizeable Energy Trade Deficit**

### **Asia Pacific: Energy Trade Balances 2012 (% GDP)**







## China: Slower Growth Is Actually A Good Thing But Risks Remain In The Property Sector (and its financing)

We think missing the 2014 growth target was a positive development:

- ✓ Credit growth (and GDP growth) since the GFC has been too fast.
- ✓ The government needs to break the growth target psychology
- √ (Does the difference between 7.4% and 7.5% really matter?)


But the downside risks are still there. How might things play out?

- ✓ Credit discipline requires defaults to reduce moral hazard
- ✓ Default(s) might cause a "Chinese-style run" on shadow banks
- ✓ Funding could dry up for a swath of investment projects
- ✓ Strong systemic banks and external surplus shore up system.
- ✓ Policy response is likely to be swift and decisive
- ✓ Hit would be investment-heavy, sharply lower growth momentum.




# Chinese Property Prices Continue to Decline The Size Of The Inventory Overhang Is Unknown

### **Newly Constructed Price m/m Change, number of cities**




Source: CEIC





## The Weaker Euro FX Rate Will Boost Exports Growth




Source: Bloomberg



### Low inflation rates also a positive for incomes

- In aggregate real wage growth since 2010 has been muted reflecting the weakness of demand and high unemployment
- Falling inflation however is now providing a significant boost to real wages








### **UK** inflation and pay

Annual % change 6.0 -----5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 Consumer price inflation Average employee earnings (excl. bonuses) 0.0 Jan-02 Jan-04 Jan-06 Jan-08 Jan-10 Jan-12 Jan-14


Sources: Markit, Office for National Statistics



## Monetary Policy: How To Kick Credit Growth Back To Life?



### Interest rates on overall new loans to Non-Financial corporations






Source: ECB

## The ECB Balance Sheet Has Actually Been Shrinking Since 2012

### Central Banks balance sheet as a % of Nominal GDP



Source: ECB, Bank of England, Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, Q4 2014



## **QE Aims At Boosting Asset Prices**

	Effects of QE on the day it was announced						
	FX	Stock indices	10-year yield (bps	5)			
QE1 Fed	-1%	0.70%	-22				
QE2 Fed	0.10%	0.40%	-2				
QE3 Fed	-0.20%	1.60%	-4				
QE BoE *	-0.40%	0.20%	-1				
QE BoJ 2013	-3.60%	2.20%	-11				
QE ECB	-1.20%	1.60%	-7				
* Average of the	ne 7 announcen	nents by the Bo	oE re: introducing or rein	forcing Q			
Source Bloomb	oerg						


### **European Housing Market Forecasts**

Nominal House Prices, % change Y/Y	2012	2013	2014-e	2015-f	2016-f
Belgium	1.5	1.2	0.5	-3.5	-2.5
France	-2.0	-1.9	-4.0	-3.0	0.0
Germany	4.6	3.2	3.0	5.0	3.5
Ireland	-6.2	6.0	16.0	9.0	5.0
Italy	-5.2	-5.3	-3.5	-2.0	1.0
Netherlands	-7.6	-4.3	2.2	1.5	2.5
Portugal	-2.7	-3.0	-1.0	1.0	1.5
Spain	-10.4	-4.6	-2.0	0.0	2.0
Switzerland	3.6	4.6	0.5	-1.0	1.0
United Kingdom	2.3	5.4	7.0	4.0	3.0

Sources: S&P, OECD, Hypoport




### **But The Eurozone Economies Remain Weak**






## The Deleveraging Has Only Just Begun







### **International Investment Position (% of GDP)**





### The Recovery in Corporate Investment Lags That In The US






Source: Eurostat, S&P calculations and forecasts



### Wrapping up: Global Macro Outlook

#### **GDP Growth Rate Forecasts (%)**

	2014	2015	2016
China	7.4	6.8	6.7
Eurozone	0.9	1.5	1.7
Japan	0.0	0.8	1.1
Latin America	0.9	0.7	2.8
United States	2.4	3.0	2.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.9	4.5	4.9
World	2.6	3.5	4.0



- ✓ We expect global growth to be a bit stronger this year and next, despite a continuing China slowdown, as the US, the eurozone, Japan, and India all grow faster.
- ✓ The shale revolution-driven decline in the oil price is positive for global growth; as post-crisis headwinds taper off and the IT revolution permeates economies, "secular stagnation" seems like a misnomer.
- ✓ The ECB's QE program is a significant policy shift that should help to underpin a surprisingly robust cyclical upswing; the Fed's cautious normalization of monetary policy should support a continued move of the US economy back to full employment.
- ✓ After a self-inflicted recession, Japan looks likely to record reasonable growth, as the BOJ continues its concerted efforts to end deflation. Success on that front could involve a reflationary tipping point.
- ✓ The Chinese economy is likely to keep gradually slowing. The credit and investment overhang remains a downside risk, but should it start to become manifest policymakers would likely counter it strongly.





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